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The February 1973 Devaluation of the Dollar
and Gold Value Clauses
E. Hirschberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War I the world has been periodically
rocked by monetary crises. Hundreds of devaluations were carried out
during this period and some revaluations. During the inter-war period
the worst monetary crisis was the devaluation of the dollar in terms of
gold carried out by the Roosevelt Administration in 1934. From 1934
to 1971 the dollar had never been devalued, even though the pound
sterling had been devalued three times, in 1940, in 1949 and in 1967.
However, since the late 1960's the reserve currencies of the world
have been in. trouble. Following the November 1967 devaluation of
the pound sterling, a pressure against the dollar developed. As a result,
the two-tier system of gold price has been established--one price
among the Central Bank, and the second the free price of gold for
other uses: ornamental, industrial, speculative and hoarding of gold.'
From May 1971 until December 18, 1971 an international mone-
tary crisis prevailed,2 as a result of which, according to the Smithsonian
agreement, the dollar was devalued by 8.6 per cent and the Japanese
yen, the German mark and several other currencies were revalued. This
was the worst monetary crisis that has erupted since 1934. It was the
first time since 1934 that the dollar had been devalued.
II. THE JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 1973 MONETARY CRISIS
A. The Basic Problems
Several basic problems influence the present instability of the dollar.
The United States balance of payments has been negative for many
years as a result of the "super-power" obligations of the United States,
namely its military and economic assistance to other free countries
* M. J. (Jerusalem); M. Phil. (London); attorney in private practice, specializing in
Commercial Law, in Jerusalem, Israel.
1. See S. SCHEPS, THE DETHRONEMENT OF GOLD (1971).
2. See Flanders, The International Monetary System, an Unsolved Problem, 1971 ISRAEL
ECON. Q. 240; Strange, The Dollar Crisis 1971, INT'L AFFAiRS, Apr. 13, 1972, at 197.
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and its involvement in Viet Nam. The United States economy has
started to lose its competitive position in relation to Japan and West-
ern Europe for two basic reasons. First, the wages standard. The aver-
age wages paid to blue collar laborers in the United States are much
higher than those prevailing in Japan and Western Europe. The
United States had for many years an advantage in productivity, in the
quality of its management, and in its technological know-how and
capacity. However, the United States has started to lose these advan-
tages. The trend is toward maximization of profits and minimization
of expenditure of effort. The first is legitimate under the free enter-
prise system, the second can be less easily defended and is one of the
reasons of present-day inflation, as productivity does not increase pro-
portionally. This tendency toward minimization of expenditure of
effort affects both management and labor and is one of the attendant
evils of the society of plenty. Second, the United States is much closer
to the saturation point in durable consumers goods than Japan and
Western Europe. Therefore, there is an outflow of capital. American
businessmen believe that better opportunities for investment and fu-
ture profits prevail elsewhere. During the whole post-World War II
period the degree of economic growth was higher in Japan and in
Western Europe than in the United States.3 Therefore there is no
outflow of capital from the United States.
American residents enjoying higher standards of prosperity tend to
carry out one-sided transfers to residents abroad. The tendency toward
travel abroad is stronger in America than elsewhere. Many American
tourists tour Europe, but only a few Europeans tour the United States.
All these reasons have contributed toward a huge deficit in the
United States balance of payments with the rest of the world; since the
beginning of the 1970's the attitude has prevailed that the dollar is an
overvalued currency. This attitude influences practical developments.
Since the February, 1973, devaluation of the dollar, a certain improve-
ment in the balance of payments has occurred. But, as the result of
floating, the value of the American dollar has decreased.
B. The Sequence of Events
Many economists believe that the Smithsonian agreement has only
effected a truce in the international monetary warfare without solving
3. See M. POSTAN, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE 1945-1964 (1967); S.
Sc-EPs, TilE DETHRONEMENT OF GOLD (1971).
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the basic problems.4 A crisis of confidence has developed in the dollar
as a result of the fact that it was devalued for the first time since 1934.
A huge amount of Euro-dollars5 held by private and central foreign
banks (de facto inconvertible) has complicated the problem.
In 1972 the international markets showed symptoms of nervousness
without causing a serious crisis. These symptoms were the high price
of gold on the free market and the problems created by the "floating"
of the pound sterling.
In January 1973 the Italian lira on capital account started to "float."
As a result, funds were transferred to Switzerland and pressure on the
Swiss franc ensued. The Swiss franc started to float and its price ap-
preciated. Hot money (Euro-dollars held by multinational companies
and oil producers) and other speculative funds were transferred to
Germany and to Japan. For several days the German mark was under
enormous pressure as funds of close to two billion dollars a day, on
the average, were exchanged into marks.
The United States published the fact that during 1972 there was
a deficit in its balance of trade of 6.4 billion dollars; 6 this pub-
lication has caused a flight from dollars. President Nixon decided to
devalue the dollar. Negotiations with Japan and Germany ensued and
the dollar was officially devalued on February 12, 1973 by 11 1/9 per
cent.7
III. THE PROBLEM OF RESERVES
A. The Public Policy Approach to Devaluations
Under the traditional gold standard which prevailed in the de-
veloped part of the world during the second part of the Nineteenth
Century and until the outbreak of World War I, devaluations were
not carried out. They were treated in theory as breach of trust, na-
tional and international, and an admission of moral and commercial
bankruptcy. Since World War I the attitude to devaluations has
changed. Monetary policy operates under different ethical standards
than it did.8 Devaluations are in fact carried out if there is no other
4. See note 2 supra.
5. Euro-dollars refers to American dollars held by European banks.
6. See NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1973, at 39. The important thing is not the statistical fact,
but rather its Impact on the speculatton which has ensued.
7. This changed the price of gold from $38.00 per fine ounce to $42.22 per fine ounce.
8. Chandler, MONETARY POLICY, in 10 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 119 (1968).
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practicable way to correct balance of payments disequilibria and to
achieve other objectives such as growth and full employment.
Technocrats and bureaucrats and even economic writers tend, how-
ever, to disregard the psychological effects of devaluation. People are
not happy when their rights are interfered with. Devaluation causes
a loss in value of money of banknotes, bank deposits, bonds, savings
and other rights expressed in terms of money. Legally, the value of
money is presumed to be stable notwithstanding inflation and devalua-
tion.9 Therefore, devaluation undermines economic stability which is
organized around the present value of money, to a lesser or a greater
degree. Devaluation, therefore, causes nervousness and crises of con-
fidence. It may also have social and political side effects. Devaluation,
once inevitable, should be carried out but only as long as other effec-
tive measures to achieve the same result are not devised. It should be
effected rationally, after taking all relevant facts into account. There-
fore, once a need for devaluation has arisen it should be carried out
from above and should be as effective as possible. However, usu-
ally devaluations are carried out as a result of pressure from below
and they are often an admission of failure by monetary authorities to
counteract the pressure of speculative funds. This is what happened
in the United States in 1968 (when the two tier market price of gold
was established), in 1971 and in February, 1973. Devaluations by in-
stallments have a destabilizing influence and undermine the confidence
in currency.
B. How Can Public Authorities Counteract Specutative Pressure?
Generally, when a speculative pressure develops against a currency
the fact that something is wrong with it is manifest to the public and
to their financial and economic advisers. The public authorities should
by then have a clear picture of the nature of the problem and of pos-
sible effective remedies. For many reasons, public authorities are often
surprised by the speculative pressure and its dimensions. They find
themselves in the position that no adequate solution has been prepared
in advance. Therefore, the public authorities should first counteract
such speculative pressure and prepare an adequate and effective solu-
tion. The time element is by then exceedingly important. The amount
of gold and foreign currency reserves is usually inadequate as these
9. See E. HiRscnr, THE NOMINALISTIc PRINCIPLE (1971).
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reserves are treated as a stop-gap measure to cope with routine trade
and payments disequilibria and not with flight from currencies. Public
authorities are faced with a situation that they may lose all available
reserves without restoring confidence.
The British Government fought devaluation for three years (from
October, 1964 until November, 1967) and in the end had to admit
defeat and carry out a devaluation.
The problem arises as to whether paper gold and paper foreign
currency can be created through taking recourse to value clauses. This
is a legal problem which is usually not seen by public officials and
economists. The solution therefore should be prepared by lawyers and
the problem should be discussed and the initiative undertaken by
them.
IV. GOLD VALUE CLAUSES
A. Why Are They Included in Contracts?
Gold value clauses have been included in contracts, and are still
included, in order to protect the parties from changes in value of
national currencies in terms of gold. If such clauses had been valid in
the summer of 1971, or in January, 1973 in the United States and in-
cluded in contracts, parties to them in the United States would have
been protected from the devaluations of the dollar which were carried
out in December, 1971 and February, 1973. Many maintain, however,
that the creditors under such clauses make only windfall profits because
the domestic value of the dollar did not change in the same measure
as its external value. But what happens if the creditors are active in
international trade and the proceeds of such contracts are to be so
applied? Through the devaluation of the domestic currency they
incur a loss, and the relative stability of domestic prices does not
recompense them for such a loss. The whole issue of freedom to include
gold value clauses is still controversial all over the world. Whatever
may be said for the abrogation of gold value clauses in the United
States, this abrogation has been too sweeping.
B. The Impact of Gold Value Clauses on the Stability
of Domestic Currency
It is maintained that gold value clauses have a detrimental impact
on the stability of the national currency. As long as such currency is
226
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relatively stable externally in terms of gold, however, such gold clauses
are relatively irrelevant. They do not add anything to the extent of the
obligation. The problem arises when a devaluation in terms of gold
is in fact carried out. Then a gold value clause becomes operative and
affects the extent of the obligation. In such a case the problem is
really not one of the stability of the national currency but one of
"equality of sacrifice." Gold value creditors receive more nominal
dollars than other creditors. Gold clauses become operative and rele-
vant only if the risk against which they protect becomes a practical
risk. Devaluation is caused by many factors and the fact that gold
clauses are included in contracts is relevant only because they enlarge
the extent of certain obligations. Gold value clauses, when included
in contracts in the pre-devaluation period, are only a symptom of
nervousness or a necessary precaution against a practical risk.
C. How Gold Value Clauses May Help Alleviate Monetary Crises
We analyze this problem from the point of view of contemporary
problems and attitudes. In our time devaluation is often treated as a
necessary evil. The monetary authorities are seldom ready to sacrifice
other objectives of public policy like growth and full employment for
the preservation of the external stability of the value of the national
currency. This fact is now known to the man in the street and his
financial advisers. Therefore, when overvaluation of a currency is
manifest and a pressure against it develops, practically the only remedy
is to carry out a devaluation in fact. Lately a rumor of devaluation,
when there is an economic case for it, can bring about a devaluation in
fact under pressure from speculative and other funds. Gold value
clauses can serve as a valuable defensive weapon in the hands of
monetary authorities once there is a pressure for devaluation. The
amount of liquid funds is so large and rumors of a possible devaluation
and of a pressure against the currency spread so quickly through the
mass media that monetary authorities are relatively defenseless and
have no choice but to give in to the pressure. This fact is known today
to the average speculator, and this in turn reinforces the expectations of
devaluation. Therefore, once a rumor spreads and a pressure develops,
the speculative expectations are directed toward devaluation and tend
to influence behavior. Gold value clauses cannot prevent devaluation
once it is necessary and overdue. But they can, by offsetting speculative
227
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pressure, provide a breathing space for the authorities so that the de-
valuation, if necessary will be carried out rationally. If it is inadvisable
to devaluate, the pressure can be counteracted and the flight from
currency stopped. Of course, such breathing space is bought at a price.
The price is worth it, however, if the devaluation itself is rational.
A very important psychological consideration must be taken into
account. When expectations of devaluation prevail, a flight from cur-
rency starts. By that time the public does not trust official denials.
Recent monetary history has proved that very often official denials of
a possibility of a devaluation are not sincere and very often miscon-
ceived.
A breathing space may be bought only through countermeasures in-
volving the sale of gold or foreign currency in the market. If the real
reserves are inadequate, recourse may and should be made to paper gold
or paper foreign currency; specifically, value clauses. This problem will
be further discussed.
In conclusion, once the expectation of a devaluation prevails it is
difficult, if not impossible, to counteract speculative activity without
having recourse to defensive weapons. Such defensive weapons are
available and can be easily created through taking recourse to value
clauses which can offset "flight from currency." Of course, if devalua-
tion is carried out in the end the monetary authorities which have
issued value clauses incur a loss. Such a loss is inconsiderable, however,
in comparison with other devaluation losses and gains. For monetary
authorities, fighting devaluation or revaluation always entails a risk
and a loss; and an irrational devaluation which is carried out hastily
and under pressure involves a grave loss for the national economy in
the long run. This problem is especially grave when there is a dollar
crisis. The dollar until 1968, and perhaps until 1971, was the most
important reserve currency of the free world. Its devaluation causes
both tangible and intangible losses, such as a loss of confidence which
may have an impact on foreign trade and international cooperation.
V. THE GOLD VALUE CLAUSES IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Traditional Attitude to Gold Clauses
Since the rapid depreciation of the Continentals, a paper currency
issued by the Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War, a
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relative distrust of paper currency has prevailed in the United States.
During the Civil War both North and South issued paper currency
which later depreciated in value. In the North the greenbacks were
declared to be legal tender, but in practice a disagio prevailed between
it and gold coin. Gold value clauses have been declared valid by the
courts.10 In Willard v. Taylohe," an order for specific performance was
granted on the condition that the purchase price would be paid in gold
coin.
After the Civil War, gold value clauses continued to be routinely
included in contracts. America has been a rapidly developing country
and its economy had shown an inflationary bias. In 1933, when gold
value clauses were abrogated in the United States, the total amount of
dollar obligations, including gold value clauses, has been estimated to
have reached the sum of 100 billion dollars. 12
B. The Abrogation of Gold Value Clauses in the United States
The Joint Resolution of both houses of Congress on June 5, 1933,
abrogated gold value clauses in dollar obligations, both in domestic
and international contracts. This was a sweeping measure proposed by
the Roosevelt Administration to facilitate the 1934 devaluation of the
dollar. It was tested and upheld by the Supreme Court,13 and exten-
sively discussed by legal writers.14 The main reason behind this enact-
ment was the approach of equality of sacrifice-"if all cannot escape
none will be allowed to." It was a step in the direction of the demoni-
tizing of gold. Gold was treated as a barbarous relic from the past and
this attitude was extended to gold clauses. Since then gold value clauses
have been invalid in the United States in dollar obligations and are
not included in such obligations.
10. Butler v. Horwitz, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 149 (1868); Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
229 (1868). See Dawson & Cooper, The Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts U.S.A., 33
MICH. L. REv. 852 (1935).
11. U.S. (8 Wall.) 490 (1869).
12. See A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 282 (2d ed.
1950).
13. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317
(1935); Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
14. See Dawson, Gold Clause Decisions, 33 MICH. L. REV. 647 (1935); Hart, The Gold
Clause in United States Bonds, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1935); Nebolsine, The Gold Clause
in Private Contracts, 42 YALE LJ. 1051 (1933); Post & Willard, The Power of Congress
to Nullify Gold Clauses, 46 HARV. I- REV. 1225 (1933).
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C. The Present Situation
The conditions and circumstances have changed since the passage
of the Joint Resolution. 5 Public policy approaches are necessarily
flexible and should change with the times and circumstances. Gold
value clauses are no longer routinely included in obligations.
Many have believed that the psychological attachment to gold is
irrational. This psychological attachment inherited by us from our
forefathers, however, is continuously reinforced by contemporary phe-
nomena. Nationalizations carried out in many countries, monetary
instability, and political, social and economic instability all reinforce
the traditional trust in gold. The use of gold for ornamental and in-
dustrial purposes is continuously increasing; in fact, supply lags behind
the demand and the price of gold has been continuously increasing
since 1968. A private party will probably be better off if he trusts gold
rather than paper money. Of course, gold carries no interest and the
price of it on the free market is volatile and fluctuates according to
speculative pressures.
Whatever the justification of the Joint Resolution of Congress on
June 5, 1933, its basic approaches should have been reconsidered and
revised in the light of the present day reality.
VI. THE PRESENT UTILITY OF GOLD VALUE CLAUSES
A. Gold Value Clauses and Their Use for Monetary Authorities
Gold value clauses could perform an eminently useful function in
case of a flight from currency. Once a flight from currency starts, a
distrust in this currency develops. But in modern conditions this dis-
trust is, except in the case of a very grave political crisis, relative and
not absolute. It extends not to paper currency itself but to its value in
terms of gold or other currencies. Therefore, the public authorities
can in theory issue obligations which include gold value clauses to an
unlimited extent in order to counteract speculative pressure. It is
worth mentioning that the "special drawing rights" issued by the
International Monetary Fund include a gold value guarantee.18
15. See Hirschberg, Gold Value Clauses and Public Policy in U.S.A., 89 BANK. L.J. 99
(1972).
16. See Gold, A Comparison of Special Drawing Rights and Gold as Reserve Assets, 2
L. &: P. INT'L Bus. 376 (1970); Johnson, The International Monetary System and the Rule
of Law, 15 J. LAw & EcoN. 277 (1972).
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The British Treasury extended a dollar guarantee to other Central
Banks, particularly those in the Sterling Block, after the 1967 devalua-
tion in order to induce them not to convert their sterling balances into
other currencies.
It must be kept in mind that the supply of gold metal and the
supply of foreign currencies is necessarily limited. The creation of
paper gold and foreign currency paper through value clauses is un-
limited. The use of value clauses may enable monetary authorities to
reduce and even offset speculative pressure to gain time to proceed
effectively and rationally on the national and international monetary
front.
Value clauses would have been eminently useful for the United States
monetary authorities in 1968, 1971 and 1973. Due to the Joint Resolu-
tion of June 5, 1933, however, they were barred from taking recourse
to value clauses. Outdated approaches continue to govern us even
when circumstances have changed.
Value clauses may be useful not only in case of revolutionary de-
velopments like a flight from currency, but also in case of evolutionary
processes. The confidence in the dollar which has been devalued twice
since 1971, has been undermined. Almost 80 billion dollars, however,
are held by foreigners and foreign central banks.'7 In the near future
they will attempt to convert dollars into francs, marks and yens, all of
which are now regarded as stronger than the dollar. This will create a
continuous pressure on the dollar; such pressure can be counteracted
only through value clauses being included in dollar obligations, i.e.,
gold or foreign currency guarantees. The International Monetary Fund
has tried to find a solution to the monetary crisis, but the solution has
not yet been found.
We have dealt here only with the public aspects of value clauses.
They may further protect legitimate interests of private parties, but
this aspect of the problem has been dealt with elsewhere in this
article.'
VII. CONCLUSION
Devaluation, if necessary, should be rational and effective. Very
often, even under favorable circumstances, it is only effective after a
17. Estimations vary. Some circles close to the International Monetary Fund estimate
the amount at 100 billion dollars. The exact figure is still unavailable from official sources,
as it varies from day to day.
18. See note 16 supra.
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certain period of time. Often it affords only a breathing space for
monetary authorities to supplement it by other measures. Devaluation
carried out under pressure is often ineffective and irrational. Gold
value clauses and foreign currency value clauses may be extremely
useful to monetary authorities in the event of a flight from currency
or the evolutionary developments brought about by the undermining
of confidence in a currency. This will require the revision or the partial
or total abrogation of the Joint Resolution of Congress of June 5, 1933.
This enactment should have been reconsidered long ago, but even now
such a reconsideration may be helpful.
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